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impact of the act is such that the manufacturer is not likely to revert
to the use of indefinite term franchises. The prohibition against cancel-
ling a franchise without cause would have the same effect on an indefinite
term franchise as a broad prohibition against not renewing a franchise
would have on a franchise for a definite term. Thus, it is perhaps
possible for manufacturers to escape the force of the act by using only
short term franchises.
THE EFFECT OF AN ADJUDICATED COMPROMISE OF A WILL
CONTEST OR CONTROVERSY UPON THE RIGHT TO
DISPOSE OF PROPERTY BY WILL
It has been stated that "no rule regarding wills is more settled than
the General Rule that the testator's intent if it is not unlawful must
prevail."' Testamentary intent is "unlawful," and thus a limitation is
imposed upon the right to dispose of property by will, if, for example,
it contravenes public policy, violates the rule against perpetuities or
attempts to devise a fee simple or absolute estate with unreasonable re-
straints imposed upon its sale or alienation.2 It would seem that enforce-
ment of agreements compromising will contests and controversies is an
additional limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will. the
purpose of this -note is to examine the common law rule concerning
agreements compromising will contests and controversies,3 the rationale
upon which judicial enforcement or recognition of these agreements is
based and the effect upon the common law rule of adjudicated compro-
mise of controversies statutes enacted by eight states and included in the
Model Probate Code.4
COMPRO-MISES AT COMMON LAW
Generally, judicial enforcement or recognition of compromise agree-
1. Cannistra Estate, 384 Pa. 605, 607, 121 A.2d 157, 158 (1956).
2. Ibid.
3. For extensive listings and discussion of cases enforcing or recognizing agree-
ments compromising will contests and controversies see generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d
1319 (1955); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 468 (1935).
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 to 303 (Burns 1953); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 204
§§ 14-18 (1955); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (115)-(118) (1943); N.J. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3A: 14-1 to -9 (1953) (this statute permits a fiduciary to compromise certain
enumerated claims or to submit them for judicial approval); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
§ 19; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 320.513, 320.945 (1950) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 33-7-12 to -17 (1956) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 318.31 (1958); MODEL PRO3ATE CODE
§§ 93-95 (Simes 1946). See Annot, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1372-1379 (1955) for a short
discussion of several of these enactments.
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ments concerns the contesting of a will on the grounds of lack of testa-
mentary capacity,' undue influence or fraud,6 failure to comply with the
requisite statutory formalities' and presence of interlineations in the will.8
The presence of two or more documents purporting to be the will of a
decedent,' conflicting claims to an estate0 and proceedings to construe a
will" are controversies which have provided a basis for a compromise
agreement.
Despite the willingness of most courts to recognize and enforce these
compromise agreements, certain agreements will not receive judicial ap-
proval or authorization. It is generally required that compromise agree-
ments be consummated in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or con-
cealment," by parties who are s'i juris" and by all interested parties."'
Furthermore, these agreements may not prejudice the interests of
minors" or creditors. 6
There is a split of authority concerning the validity of compromise
agreements where testamentary trusts are involved. The courts of some
jurisdictions adhere to the general rule that the beneficiaries under a will
may agree among themselves for a distribution of the estate in a manner
different from that provided by the will, but add that the agreements are
ordinarily not given effect where there is a trust or specific restriction
5. E.g., Schaefer v. Thoeny, 199 Minn. 610, 273 N.W. 190 (1937); Wragner v.
Honbaier, 248 N.C. 363, 103 S.E.2d 474 (1958).
6. E.g., Schoen v. Wagner, 231 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. App. 1950); In the Matter of
Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960).
7. E.g., In re Estate of Donlen, 145 Neb. 370, 16 N.W.2d 731 (1944).
8. E.g., McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 186 Md. 165, 46 A.2d 307 (1946).
9. E.g., Atkins v. Womble, 300 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Robbins v.
Simmons' Estate, 252 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
10. E.g., Love v. Rennie, 254 Ala. 382, 48 So.2d 458 (1950); Youngelson v.
Youngelson's Estate, 114 So.2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Bergman v. Bergman,
247 Iowa 98, 73 N.W.2d 92 (1955); Muller v. Sprenger, 105 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1960).
11. E.g., Gray v. Trust Co., 211 Ga. 332, 85 S.E.2d 721 (1955) ; Smith's Ex'r v.
Crush, 296 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1956).
12. E.g., Youngelson v. Youngelson's Estate, 114 So.2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Bakke v. Bakke, 242 Iowa 612, 47 N.W.2d 813 (1951); In the Matter of Will
of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960) ; Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Morris,
168 Va. 379, 191 S.E. 764 (1937).
13. E.g., Love v. Rennie, 254 Ala. 382, 48 So.2d 458 (1950); Skelly v. Graybill,
109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959).
14. See, e.g., In the Matter of Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d
562 (1960) ; Cook v. Morrison, 202 Okla. 693, 217 P.2d 810 (1950)) ; Fore v. McFadden,
276 S.W. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Hunter v. Jordan, 158 Wash. 539, 291 Pac. 471
(1930).
15. E.g., Wagner v. Honbaier, 248 N.C. 363, 103 S.E.2d 474 (1958); Rice v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 232 N.C. 222, 59 S.E.2d 803 (1950).
16. E.g., In the Matter of Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562
(1960); Skelly v. Graybill, 109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959); Robbins v.
Simmons' Estate, 252 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
529
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placed upon the property by the terms of the will.1 7 These courts maintain
that to modify or terminate the trust before its objectives were achieved
would be to defeat the intention of the testator. The courts of other
jurisdictions enforce compromise agreements which modify or terminate
testamentary trusts primarily for the reason that they maintain family
harmony and eliminate costly litigation.
The courts do not regard compromise agreements as a limitation
upon the right to dispose of property by will. In fact, there is a striking
absence of discussion of such a limitation. It appears that the estate
is considered as passing to the legatees and devisees immediately at the
time of the testator's death, so that any rights acquired by a compromise
agreement are the result of concessions made by the beneficiaries to them-
selves or the intestate successors and are not acquired by a change in the
will. That is, a compromise agreement is considered a valid contract
which will be enforced by the courts. Many agreements provide that the
will is to be probated and the estate administered according to its terms
so that the parties are relegated to their contractual rights to enforce
these agreements. This prompts some courts to maintain that any com-
promise agreement is enforceable solely to the extent of a recovery for a
breach of contract. 9 The more liberal courts, however, still regarding the
agreement as a contract, issue a probate decree which recognizes the
compromise agreement and which provides for a distribution of the
estate in accordance with its terms.2"
Some courts maintain that the surrendering of a doubtful claim
or right,2 the forebearance of the right to institute judicial proceedings2
17. Smith's Ex'r v. Crush, 296 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1956); Schoen v. Wagner, 231
S.W.2d 269 (Mo. App. 1950); Skelly v. Graybill, 109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218(1959). For unenforceable agreements compromising a contest of a will which affect a
testamentary trust see, e.g., Adams v. Link, 145 Conn. 634, 145 A.2d 753; Altemeier
v. Harris, 903 Ill. 345, 86 N.E.2d 229 (1949) (spendthrift trust). For unenforceable
agreements compromising a controversy concerning a testamentary trust duly established
see, e.g., Peiter v. Degenring, 136 Conn. 331, 71 A.2d 87 (1949); Hopp v. Rain, 249
Iowa 891, 88 N.W.2d 39 (1959) ; Estate of Mowinkel, 130 Neb. 10, 263 N.W. 488 (1935).
18. Non-spendthrift trusts: E.g., Hobbs v. Cobb, 339 S.W.2d 318 (Ark. 1960)
(proceeding to construe; modification); Estate of Nicholson, 104 Colo. 561, 93 P.2d
880 (1939) (contract to terminate) ; White v. Bourne, 151 Fla. 12, 9 So.2d 170 (1942)
(will contest; termination); Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 38 S.E.2d 203 (1946)
(will contest; modification) ; Rice v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 232 N.C. 222, 59
S.E.2d 803 (1950) (will contest; modification). Spendthrift trust: Johnson v. Morawitz,
292 F.2d 341 (10th Civ. 1961) (dictum).
19. E.g., Rogers v. Benz, 136 Minn. 83, 161 N.W. 395 (1917); Schoen v. Wagner,
231 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. App. 1950).
20. E.g., Kennedy v. Quinn, 177 Ark. 1069, 9 S.W.2d 315 (1928); Gray v. Trust
Co., 211 Ga. 332, 85 S.E.2d 721 (1955) ; Fore v. McFadden, 276 S.W. 327 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925).
21. E.g., In re Estate of Donlen, 145 Neb. 370, 16 N.W.2d 731 (1944).
22. E.g., Benner v. Lunt, 126 Me. 167, 136 Atl. 814 (1927) ; Ewing v. Waddington,
62 S.D. 166, 252 N.W. 28 (1933).
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or the mutual promises of refraining from judicial action and the trans-
ferring of a portion or larger portion of the estate to parties to the
agreement23 supply sufficient consideration to enable these compromise
agreements to be enforced as contracts. Other courts stress that com-
promise agreements are to be supported as they preserve family harmony"
or avoid litigation whereby the estate would be wasted away.2" An Iowa
court has stated that when considering the compromise of "family dis-
putes where the motive is to preserve the honor or peace of the family,
or the family property, the courts will not closely scrutinize the consider-
ation or look into the merits of the dispute where all is fair and above-
board.""
The courts in recognizing compromise agreements have, in fact,
imposed a limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will. Even
if a contract theory is adopted, the indisputable fact remains that when
a probate decree distributes an estate in conformity with a compromise
agreement, the wishes of the testator stated in his will are being con-
travened.
EFFECT OF STATUTES ON COMiMON LAw
Contrary to what might be expected, the adjudicated compromise
of controversy statutes which have been enacted do not, with the known
exception of one state, establish an entirely new limitation upon the right
to dispose of property by will. These statutes do, however, have some
effect upon judicial treatment of compromise agreements which involve
testamentary trusts. The adjudicated compromise statutes are generally
regarded as based upon the same contract rationale as that of the common
law. For example, the stipulations or interpreations of some of these
statutes that an agreement effectuated pursuant to the statute shall not
affect assessment of state inheritance taxes presupposes that a testator's
property does pass according to the provisions of the will." Any devia-
23. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 185 Miss. 53, 187 So. 209 (1939) ; Schoen v.
Lange, 238 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. App. 1951).
24. In re Estate of Noble, 141 Kan. 432, 41 P.2d 1021 (1935) ; In the Matter of
Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960); Skelly v. Graybill, 109
Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959).
25. Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927); Irwin v. Irwin, 15
Ill. App. 2d 52, 145 N.E.2d 284 (1957) (abstract only) ; Bakke v. Bakke, 242 Iowa 612,
47 N.W.2d 813 (1951) ; Smith's Fx'r v. Crush, 296 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1956).
26. Bergman v. Bergman, 247 Iowa 98, 104, 73 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1955).
27. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 (Burns 1953); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 93 (Simes
1946); Baxter v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911)(construing MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 204 § 15-18 (1955). But cf. Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188 (1938) where the United States Supreme Court refused to apply for
federal income taxation the Massachusetts rule that the state succession tax is applied
to the property that passes by the terms of the will and not as changed by a compromise
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tion from provisions of a will is a result of concessions made by the
beneficiaries who contract with reference to their own property which
they have received by the will. The notes to section 93 of the Model
Probate Code point out that in most states there seems to be no obstacle
at common law to interested persons who are sid juris consummating an
agreement concerning a decedent's estate, but that legislation is desirable
to embrace situations where incompetent, unascertained or unborn persons
are interested parties.2" By this analysis, an adjudicated compromise
statute is considered merely as a means of facilitating contracts when
these special interests are present. The refusal of some courts to apply an
adjudicated compromise statute to testamentary trusts under certain
circumstances on the theory that to do so would be to nullify testamentary
intent further supports the conclusion that the statutes are based upon a
contract rationale. On the other hand, courts of some of the states which
have adopted statutes now hold that an agreement receiving judicial ap-
proval or authorization does limit the right to dispose of property by will.
An examination of the states adopting these statutes supports these gen-
eral conclusions.
Michigan
Common Law; Rationale. Prior to the enactment of the statute pro-
viding for the settlement of the contest of wills and the compromise of
rights thereunder, Michigan courts enforced such agreements, consider-
ing them not to contravene public policy unless they were made collusively
or in fraud of other parties.2" Early cases held that the termination of
the controversy or a promise to forebear from contesting a will was a
sufficient consideration for an agreement which resulted in a distribution
of an estate different from that stipulated in a will."
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law. The wording of the
agreement) ; In re Cress' Estate, 335 Mich. 551, 56 N.W.2d 380 (construing Micu. STAT.
ANN.: 27.3178 (115)-(118) (1943)) ; Estate of Jorgensen, 267 Wis. 1, 64 N.W.2d 430
(1954) (construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 318.31 (1958)).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 (Bums 1953); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 17
(1955); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (115) (1943); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 93 (Simes
1946) stipulate that an adjudicated compromise shall not impair the rights of creditors.
28. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 93, comment (Simes 1946). Section 94(c) provides
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor, or persons otherwise incompetent,
unascertained persons or future contingent interests that may be affected by a compromise
agreement.
29. See, e.g., Sellers v. Perry, 191 Mich. 619, 158 N.W. 144 (1916); Conklin v.
Conklin, 165 Mich. 571, 131 N.W. 154 (1911).
30. E.g, Baas v. Zinke, 218 Mich. 552, 188 N.W. 512 (1922) ; Layer v. Layer, 184
Mich. 663, 151 N.W. 759 (1915).
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present Michigan Statute,3' as well as the title to the original enactment32
coupled with judicial interpretation of the statute,3" indicate that the
purpose of the enactment was to provide a means of facilitating settle-
ments when minors, incompetents, unborn or unascertained persons
were involved, and that by Michigan law no legislation was needed to
enable persons sui juris to enter into compromise agreements. Conse-
quently agreements between persons legally competent to act in their own
behalf have been enforced or recognized without resort to the adjudi-
cated compromise statute.34
Similarly, the statute may not always be needed when those interests
specifically protected are or may be affected. It appears the Michigan
courts have, without depending upon statutory authority, decreed the
specific performance of a compromise agreement negotiated by a guardian
or guardian ad litem of a minor." Likewise the court before which a
compromise agreement is sought to be enforced could conceivably appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent incompetents or unascertained or unborn
persons on its own authority by analogy to agreements involving minors.
Further, a court might consider the persons specified in the statute as
31. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (115) (1943).
The compromise, settlement or adjustment of any good faith contest of
the admission to probate of any instrument propounded a's the last will and
testament of any decedent, or of any good faith controversy (a) as to the con-
struction, validity or effect of such instrument or any provision thereof, whether
such controversy shall arise before or after such instrument has been admitted
to probate, or (b) as to the rights or interests in the estate of such decedent
of any person as beneficiary under such will, or of any child or issue of a de-
ceased child claimed to have been intentionally omitted from such will, or of
the widow claiming to exercise any right of election, or (c) otherwise arising
in or growing out of the administration of the estate of any decedent under such
will, or of any trust created thereby ...or any distribution under such will or
of any trust, when there is or may be any person interested who is a minor or
otherwise without legal capacity to act in person, or whose present existence
or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, or where there is any inalienable estate
or future contingent estate or interest which will or may be affected by such
compromise, settlement or adjustment.
32. Pub. Acts 1921, No. 249, p. 464.
An Act to provide for the compromise, settlement or adjustment of any
contest of the probate of any instrument propounded for probate as the last
will of a deceased person or of any controversy arising concerning the inter-
pretation, effect or validity of any such instrument, or arising in the administra-
tion of an estate under a will or under a trust created by will, when there is
or may be any person interested who is a minor or otherwise without legal
capacity to act in person or whose present existence or whereabouts cannot be
ascertained, or when there is any inalienable estate or interest or future con-
tingent estate or interest which will or may be affected by such compromise,
settlement or adjustment.
33. Int re Peck's Estate, 323 Mich. 11, 34 N.W.2d 533 (1948) ; Appeal of Hannan,
227 Mich. 569, 199 N.W. 423 (1924).
34. E.g., It re Kehlman Estate, 359 Mich. 4, 101 N.W.2d 349 (1960) ; Krause v.
Hoffman, 239 Mich. 348, 214 N.W. 146 (1927).
35. See Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923).
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being sufficiently protected if persons having the same interest who are
before the court are "equally certain to bring forward the entire merits"36
of the will contest or controversy that is sought to be compromised.
However, a statutory provision insuring the representation of minors,
incompetents, unborn and unascertained persons is desirable in light of the
difficulties these interests present in property litigation."
It was not until 1956 that the effect of the adjudicated compromise
statute upon testamentary trusts was determined. Previously, the courts
did approve some compromise agreements, made pursuant to the statute,
which affected testamentary trusts.38 On the other hand, there were also
instances in which the courts would not aprove compromise agreements
which sought to modify or terminate a testamentary trust, at least if the
trusts were spendthrift trusts." In 1956 it was held that regardless of the
presence or absence of trust provisions in an instrument submitted but not
yet admitted to probate, the probate or chancery courts could "approve and
effectuate a compromise of a good faith contest over the admission of such
instrument to probate."4 The court maintained that the statute provided
for the compromise of "'any good faith contest' upon the admission to
probate of 'any instrument' propounded as a last will" and did not con-
tain any words purporting an exclusion of spendthrift trusts."' In
distinguishing those cases which refused to apply the statute when a testa-
mentary trust was involved, the court reasoned that a distinction existed
between an instrument burdened with contest, one that had not passed
ihe "ordeal of probate,"42 and an instrument already admitted to probate.43
36. Detroit Trust Co. v. Neubauer, 325 Mich. 319, 339, 38 N.W.2d 371, 3S0 (1949).
Accord Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927) ; Wagner v. Honbaier,
248 N.C. 363, 103 S.E.2d 474 (1958).
37. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (116) (1943) provides for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for minors and incompetents, if not already represented by a guardian,
and guardians ad litem to represent both persons whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained
and any future contingent interest or estate that might be taken 'by any person not then
in being, which may be limited or diminished by any compromise, settlement or adjustment.
38. Detroit Trust Co. v. Neubauer, 325 Mich. 319, 38 N.W.2d 371 (1949) ; Dodge v.
Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W.2d 509 (1942); It re Marxhausen's Estate,
247 Mich. 192, 225 N.W. 632 (1929).
39. Hay v. LeBus, 317 Mich. 698, 27 N.W.2d 309 (1947) ; Rose v. Southern Mich.
Nat'l Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 234 (1931). (It was recognized in Rose that a
court of equity had power by virtue of the adjudicated compromise of controversies
statute to modify or extinguish a trust under circumstances but this trust, a spend-
thrift trust, belonged to that class of trusts which could not be terminated until its
objects and purposes had been accomplished.)
40. It re Dutton Estate, 347 Mich. 186, 190, 79 N.W.2d 608, 610 (1956).
41. It re Dutton Estate, 347 Mich. 186, 79 N.W.2d 608 (1956).
42. Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 405, 428 (1868).
43. It re Dutton Estate, 347 Mich. 186, 79 N.W.2d 608 (1956). It is not readily
apparent how Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat'l Bank can be so distinguished. The com-
promise agreement was executed only after a prolonged will contest, an appeal taken
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Therefore, the adjudicated compromise statute is applicable only to testa-
mentary trusts when there is a contest concerning the admission to probate
of the will and not to any controversy concerning the trust after the will
has been probated, in spite of the wording of the statute which could be
construed to apply a contrary result."
This distinction seems incongruous. The reasons for the enforce-
ment of compromise agreements generally are the avoidance of litigation
and the maintenance of family harmony. If the avoidance of an expen-
sive will contest which all parties desire to compromise is regarded as a
compelling circumstance justifying enforcement of a compromise agree-
ment,4" why are not the avoidance of litigation and the maintenance
of family harmony likewise considered valid grounds justifying enforce-
ment of a compromise agreement when controversy arises concerning the
determination of rights under a testamentary trust which has been ap-
proved by a probate court? One possible reason for this distinction is the
implication from those cases refusing to approve the compromise agree-
ments affecting testamentary trusts that to so approve an agreement
would be to defeat testamentary intent-that is, to impose a limitation
upon the right to dispose of property by will. However, this is being
done anyway by the approval of compromise agreements, although it is
not recognized.
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law Rationale. While there
is some conflict of authority, it appears Michigan has adopted the
rationale of the traditional common law position that rights involved
in a compromise agreement are the contractual rights of beneficiaries.
Compromise agreements, whether or not effectuated pursuant to the
adjudicated compromise statute, are not considered to alter the fact that
the property immediately passes by will to the beneficiaries when the
testator dies."0 Further, a comparison of the parties required to execute
a compromise agreement prior to and subsequent to the enactment of the
adjudicated compromise statute supports the conclusion that the statute
from a directed verdict sustaining the will and a bill of exceptions settled and signed.
Had the will passed the "ordeal of probate?"
44. MICH. STAT. ANNz. § 27.2178 (115) (1943) provides for:
the compromise, settlement or adjustment of any good faith contest of the
admission to probate of any instrument propounded as the last will and testament
of any decedent, or of any good faith controversy (a) as to the construction,
validity or effect of any such instrument or any provision thereof, whether
such controversy shall arise before or after such instrument has been admitted
to probate . . . or (c) otherwise arising out of the administration of the
estate of any decedent under such will, or of any trust created thereby . . .
including any distribution under such will or trust. . ..
45. In re Dutton Estate, 347 Mich. 186, 79 N.W.2d 608 (1956).
46. In re Cress' Estate, 335 Mich. 551, 56 N.W.2d 380 (1953).
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enacted the common law rationale. Pre-statute decisions required that
compromise agreements be consummated by persons interested in the
estate and not affect the rights of persons not parties to the agreement."T
The statute has adopted essentially the same position in that it requires
that any agreement sought to be approved by the court be executed by all
competent persons, except those whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained,
"having estates, interests, or claims which will or may be limited or
diminished in either extent or value by such compromise, settlement or
adjustment if consummated."48 Both requirements contemplate that the
parties to the agreement are contracting with reference to property they
have received by will.
Moreover, an executor or petitioner with the will annexed is not
required to execute the agreement when it is submitted to the court.4"
It is only after the agreement is approved that the court authorizes the
execution by these fiduciaries of a compromise, settlement or adjust-
ment."° In a proper case a court can compel an executor or trustee to
execute a compromise agreement.51 If the statute were regarded as a
limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will, a representative
of an estate would be a necessary party, as the property was to be dis-
tributed in a manner different from that provided by the testator.
The requirement that an executor, administrator with the will an-
nexed or a trustee execute the agreement, even against his wishes, may be
a recognition that the estate has an interest in an adjudicated compromise,
even though this interest is not considered in contract actions enforcing
compromise agreements. There is further evidence that since the enact-
ment, compromise agreements may be considered a limitation upon the
right to dispose of property by will. In interpreting the statute one judge
stated that it was not intended to nullify the right to dispose of property
by will except in the absence of compelling circumstances to the contrary. 2
This is a recognition that a will is altered by a judicially approved com-
promise agreement.
Summary. The Michigan adjudicated compromise statute providing
for the settlement of contests concerning wills or rights thereunder does
not appear to change the common law position on compromise agreements.
The obvious purpose of the statute is to facilitate settlement agreements
47. See, e.g., Sellers v. Perry, 191 Mich. 619, 158 N.W. 144 (1916); Conklin v.
Conklin, 165 Mich. 571, 131 N.W. 154 (1911).
48. MicH. STAT. A N. § 27.3178 (116) (1943).
49. Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat'l Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931).
50. MICH STAT. AxN. § 27.3178 (116) (1943).
51. Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat'l Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931).
52. Hay v. LeBus, 317 Mich. 698, 27 N.W.2d 309 (1947).
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when certain special interests are present, although it is not clear whether
a statute is necessary for that purpose. Michigan does not regard the right
to dispose of property by will as being limited and therefore enforces
compromise agreements using the contract rationale.
New York
Common Law; Rationale. New York recognized and enforced agree-
ments which compromised will contests and controversies on the basis of
contract law before the agreements received statutory authorization.53
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law. The New York legisla-
ture, when it enacted the adjudicated compromise statute, 4 may have
felt that legislation was necessary merely to facilitate compromise agree-
ments when unascertainec" or unborn persons or persons without legal
capacity were or might be affected. In fact the title to the enactment is,
"Compromise of controversies arising between claimants to property or
estates where the interests of infants, incompetents or persons unknown
or not in being are or may be affected."5 One court maintained that the
statute, as indicated by the title as well as its context, was to be applied
only when such interests were involved,5" whereas another court stated
that the statute concerned itself primarily with those interests." Still
another court which sought to apply the statute maintained that, although
the title appeared to limit its application to the special interests, the
statute's provisions were to be complied with if judicial approval of the
compromise was desired, even when the special interests were not in-
53. See, e.g., Schoonmaker v. Gray, 208 N.Y. 209, 101 N.E. 886 (1913); Minehan
v. Hill, 144 App. Div. 854, 129 N.Y. Supp. 873 (1911); Seaman v. Seaman, 12 Wend.
381 (N.Y. S.C. 1834).
54. N.Y. DEcn. EsT. LAW § 19 provides that:
(a) The Supreme Court or the surrogate's court having jurisdiction of the estate
or property involved may authorize executors, administrators and trustees to
adjust by compromise any controversy that may arise between different claimants
to the estate or property in their hands. . . . (b) The Supreme Court or the
surrogate's court having jurisdiction of the estate or property involved may
likewise authorize the person or persons named as executors in one or more
instruments purporting to be the last will and testament of a person deceased,
or the petitioners for administration with such will annexed, to adjust by com-
promise any controversy that may arise between the persons claiming as devisees
or legatees . . . and the persons entitled to or claiming the estate of the
deceased under the statutes regulating the descent and distribution of intestate
estates. ...
55. N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW. § 19.
56. In the Matter of White, 182 Misc. 223, 46 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Surr. Ct. 1943),
afr'd, 268 App. Div. 759, 49 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1944), appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 759,
51 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1944), appeal dimnissed, 293 N.Y. 767, 57 N.E.2d 845 (1944).
57. In the Matter of Estate of Sidman, 154 Misc. 675, 278 N.Y. Supp. 43 (Surr.
Ct. 1935).
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volved"
Consequently, it appears that the adjudicated compromise statute
may be applicable to any controversy between claimants to the property
or estate or a decedent. The statutory procedure enabling the parties
involved to have a court order or decree approving the agreement, instead
of necessitating an action for a breach of contract, may be of sufficient
advantage so that the statute will be invoked by persons sui fitris, even
when no persons or interests specifically protected are or may be affected.
New York adopts the position that when a compromise agreement
proposes to affect an established testamentary trust, the agreement will
be given no effect as to the trust." However, if there is a contest or
controversy concerning the admission of the will to probate, a compromise
agreement may be approved which modifies or terminates a testamentary
trust.0 Since, as will be discussed, New York recognizes a limitation
upon the right to dispose of property by will for real and substantial
reasons, it is not apparent why litigation concerning a testamentary trust
already established would not be embraced within such a limitation.
Furthermore, such a compromise could conceivably be effectuated pur-
suant to the section of the adjudicated compromise statute that permits
a trustee to adjust by compromise "any controversy that may arise be-
tween claimants to the property in . . . [his] hands"'" if the proper
court has jurisdiction of the estate or property. However, the statutory
restraints placed upon the alienation of trust income 2 are sufficient to
58. In the Matter of Will of Yates, 26 Misc.2d 462, 202 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Surr. Ct.
1960).
59. See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Caswell, 185 Misc. 599, 56 N.Y.S.2d 507
(Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 809, 56 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1945). The court did not
approve the agreement which terminated the testamentary trust maintaining that any
agreement was violative of the statutory prohibition against the alienation of trust
income. It was stated in dictum that New York permitted the modification or termination
of a testamentary trust by an agreement which compromised a controversy concerning
the admission of the will to probate. This restriction seems somewhat unwarranted in
light of N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 19(a) which permits "executors, administrators and
trustees to adjust by compromise any controversy that may arise between different
claimants to the estate or property in their hands."
60. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 253 N.Y. 260, 170 N.E. 912 (1930) ; In the Matter of
Estate of O'Keeffe, 167 Misc. 148, 3 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Surr. Ct. 1938). "Only after the
probate of the will and the setting up of trusts did the statutes against alienation of
income become applicable under the public policy of our state requiring that the rule of
indestructibility of trusts be rigidly enforced." Id. at 150, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
61. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW § 19 (a).
62. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103 provides, "The right of a beneficiary of an express
trust to receive rents and profits of real estate and apply them to the use of any person,
cannot be transferred by assignment or otherwise, but the right and interest of the
beneficiaries of any other trust in real property . . .may be transferred." N.Y. PERs.
PRop. LAW § 15 provides, "The right of the beneficiary to enforce the performance of a
trust to receive the income of personal property, and to apply it to the use of any person,
cannot be transferred by assignment or otherwise. But the right and interest of the
beneficiary of any other trust in personal property . . . may be enforced."
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protect the intentions of a testator, unless there is a contest concerning the
admission of the will to probate.
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law Rationale. New York
appears to have placed its adjudicated compromise statute in the proper
perspective. The pre-statute compromise agreements, being enforced
on the basis of contract law, did not refer to the limiting effect of com-
promise agreements upon the right to dispose of property by will, thereby
implying that the courts regarded the property passing by the will
immediately at the time of the testator's death with any change in the
ultimate disposition of the estate being the result of concessions made by
the beneficiaries with reference to their own property. On the other
hand, the statute's purpose and effect have been interpreted as actually
defeating testamentary intent, but only for "real and substantial
reasons." 3 That testamentary intent is not completely disregarded is
evidenced by the fact that the court in which a compromise agreement
is sought to be approved determines the following: (1) if the proposed
agreement to which all the parties who are sui juris have already agreed
is fair to the decedent in view of the surrounding circumstances, as well
as (2) if it protects the interests of infants, incompetents or persons un-
known or not in being who are or may be affected. 4 Nevertheless, the
63. In the Matter of Estate of Wadsworth, 142 Misc. 717, 723-24, 256 N.Y. Supp.
348, 354 (Surr. Ct.) aff'd, 236 App. Div. 712, 258 N.Y. Supp. 982 (1932):
I do not believe that it is the intent or purpose of the statute that a decedent's
disposition of his or her property made in an instrument purporting to be his or
her last will and testament should be regarded as of little consequence or that
it should be lightly considered and easily set aside. The intent and purpose of
the statute, it seems to me, is not primarily to defeat the expressed direction
of a decedent as to the disposition to be made of his property because his relatives
are dissatisfied with the disposition thereof made by him, but rather to provide
a means of compromising and settling real and bona fide difficulties and differ-
ences and disputes and controversies existing or arising between different
interests concerning which bona fide and extended litigation is pending or
threatened. The statute is founded on common sense and, in support of public
policy, favors the avoidance of litigation, but does not, I believe, favor the defeat
of a testator's disposition of his property and his interest in relation thereto
except for real and substantial reasons. If it were otherwise the making of a
will would be an empty useless formality. No testator could have any assurance
that he would have anything whatever to say as to what should be done with
his property or to whom it should go. All wills would then in the last analysis
be subject to reduction to the common formula-I leave all of my property to
such disposition as my distributees shall see fit to make of it-subject only to
the approval of the surrogate. The desires and intents of the distributees would
then be substituted for the desire and intent of the testator and would be
controlling, subject always to the approval of the surrogate. The intent of the
testator would become of little or no importance. This statute it seems to me
has no such intent or purpose.
64. In the Matter of Estate of Jefferies, 155 Misc. 464, 279 N.Y. Supp. 924 (Surr.
Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 747, 287 N.Y. Supp. 151 (1936).
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presence or threat of litigation is regarded as a sufficient justification
to alter a testamentary disposition.
Recognizing that a compromise agreement limits the right to dispose
of property by will implies that since enactment of the statute the New
York courts, in approving a compromise agreement, do not regard a
will as taking effect immediately upon the testator's death. An adjudi-
cated compromise is not considered solely as an agreement by persons
contracting with respect to their own property. The legislature has re-
quired that a proposed compromise agreement be executed by representa-
tives of the estate, 5 as well as by representatives for those persons spe-
cifically protected," those claiming as beneficiaries and those claiming
the estate as intestate unless their interests will be unaffected by a pro-
posed compromise agreement."
Summary. The enactment of the adjudicated compromise statute
did not provide for the effectuation of compromise agreements that were
not recognized or enforced prior to their statutory authorization. How-
ever, the statute does facilitate compromise agreements, especially where
special interests are involved. As opposed to the traditional common law
position, New York, since enactment of the statute, regards a compromise
agreement as a limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will.
Wisconsin
Common Law; Rationale. Although in the overwhelming majority
of the states the right to make a will is regarded as one created by statute
and subject to the control of the legislature," Wisconsin considers it a
natural, inherent right protected by the constitution and affirmed by
statute. 9 The right to make a will, it is reasoned, is incidental to the
right to acquire property and includes the right to have the provisions
of the will effectuated."0 Consequently, the sole jurisdiction of the court
as to an instrument purporting to be a last will and testament is to deter-
mine if it is the will of the decedent, and, if it is, to enforce the intention
of the testator if it can be ascertained, provided such direction does not
contravene a statute or public policy.7
Until the enactment of the adjudicated compromise statute in 1951,
the Wisconsin courts were firmly opposed to the recognition or enforce-
65. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 19(a); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 19(b).
66. N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 19(c) ; N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 19(d).
67. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 19(b).
68. PAGE, WILLS § 3.1 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
69. E.g., Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956, 137 N.W. 778 (1912) ; Nunne-
macher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
70. Will of Rice, 150 Wis., 401, 136 N.W. 956, 137 N.W. 778 (1912).
71. Ibid.
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ment of agreements compromising will contests and controversies.72 Even
though the provisions of an agreement contemplated that the estate was
to be administered and distributed by the terms of the will and that the
agreement was to be effective only after these procedures, compromise
agreements were not enforceable as the ultimate result was to limit the
right to dispose of property by will. 3 Moreover, it was maintained that
proceedings to establish a will were proceedings in rem to which all
the persons in the world were, in effect, parties.'4 Besides the heirs
or legatees, the determination of whether an instrument was the will of
a decedent was regarded as possibly affecting the rights and interests
of others which could not be determined until the will was established as
the will of the decedent.7 5
Effect of thw Statute Upon Common Law and Common Law
Rationale. In 1951, Wisconsin enacted a statute providing for an adjudi-
cated compromise of controversies concerning decedents' estates which,
with minor exceptions, is identical to the New York statute. 6 However,
in upholding the constitutionality of this enactment,7" about which there
had been some doubt,7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not adopt the
interpretation given to the New York adjudicated compromise statute.
New York recognized that the right to dispose of property by will might
be limited for real and substantial reasons. On the other hand, Wisconsin
enacted the common law position, as did Michigan, that compromise
72. See Taylor v. Hoyt, 207 Wis. 520, 242 N.W. 141 (1932); Graef v. Kanouse,
205 Wis. 597, 238 N.W. 377 (1931) ; Will of Rice, 150 N.W. 40, 136 N.W. 956, 137
N.W. 778 (1912) ; Will of Dardis, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332 (1908). But see Estate
of North, 242 Wis. 72, 7 N.W.2d 705 (1942) (the life beneficiary of a trust agreed not
to contest the probate of a will and to release all interest as an heir or a testamentary
beneficiary under a will to three of the remaindermen who agreed to pay money and
assign their interests to the life beneficiary. It was recognized that a beneficiary of a
trust whose rights are vested can convey his vested interest. The court did not consider
the contention that it was only an offer not to contest the will and consequently an attempt
to evade a testamentary disposition.)
73. Taylor v. Hoyt, 207 Wis. 520, 242 N.W. 141 (1932); Graef v. Kanouse, 205
Wis. 597, 238 N.W. 377 (1931).
74. Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956, 137 N.W. 778 (1912); Will of
Dardis, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332 (1908).
75. Will of Dardis, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332 (1908).
76. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 318.31 (1958) provides:
(1) The court may authorize executors, administrators and trustees to adjust
by compromise any controversy that may arise between different claimants to
the estate or property in their hands. . . . (2) The court may likewise authorize
the person or persons named as executors in one or more instruments purporting
to be the last will and testament of a person deceased or the petitioners for
administration with such will or wills annexed, to adjust by compromise any
controversy that may arise between persons claiming as devisees or legatees . . .
and the persons entitled- to or claiming the estate of the deceased under the
statutes regulating the descent and distribution of intestate estates .
77. Estate of Jorgensen, 267 Wis. 1, 64 N.W.2d 430 (1954).
78. Note, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 342.
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agreements are to be regarded as contracts by persons who have already
received property by will and not as a limitation upon the right to dispose
of property by will. Interpreting the statute, the court stated:
Reading said section as authorizing the admission of a
will to probate, not as executed by the testator, but as judicially
amended, would require us to hold the statute unconstitutional,
because such a construction would be against the fundamental
constitutional right to dispose of property by will . . . and no,
one-the beneficiaries, the heirs, the courts, or the legislature,
or all of them together-can rewrite a will so as to effect a
distribution other than that provided by the testator ...
That section does nothing more than provide the mechanics
whereby a compromise agreement under a will, which agreement
would have been invalid before the enactment of that section,
can be made in open court and thus become a valid and enforce-
able agreement. It goes without saying that anyone acquiring
property as a legatee under a will has, and had before the enact-
ment of this statute, the right to assign the whole or any portion
of his property. The point to be noted and the point in issue
here is that the legatee must acquire such property before he
can assign it."9
The previous hostility toward agreements compromising will con-
tests on the ground that proceedings to establish a will might affect
persons other than the heirs or legatees made it essential that an adjudi-
cated compromise statute specify the parties required to execute a pro-
posed agreement of compromise. If the controversy concerns the will of
a decedent this includes persons claiming the estate as beneficiaries under
the will and those claiming the estate as statutory distributees8 This
requirement is not substantially a departure from the common law re-
quirement in other states that a compromise agreement be executed by
all interested parties, especially in view of the fact that the statute has
been interpreted as only facilitating contracts. On the other hand, the
requirement that the executor or executors if they have not renounced,
or the petitioner or petitioners with the will annexed execute the agree-
ment"' is apparently a departure from the common law position and may
be some recognition that parties to an agreement are not actually con-
tracting with reference to their own property.
79. Estate of Jorgensen, 267 Wis. 1, 7-8, 64 N.W.2d 430, 434 (1954).
80. Wis. STAT. AxN. § 318-31(2) (1958).
81. Ibid.
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The Wisconsin position as to compromise agreements affecting
testamentary trusts is not yet apparent. It is conceivable that the New
York position will be followed on the theory that one state in adopting
a statute of another state intends also to adopt the construction placed
upon the statute. Furthermore, since Wisconsin does not have statutory
restraints placed upon the alientation of trust income, compromise agree-
ments affecting testamentary trusts may be enforceable under the section
granting to a trustee the power "to adjust by compromise any controversy
that may arise between different claimants to the estate or property
in . . . [his] hands."8 However, Wisconsin did not adopt the New
York interpretation as to the effect of an adjudicated compromise upon
the right to dispose of property by will. In view of the paramount im-
portance given to testamentary intent by the Wisconsin courts, it is
more plausible that the Michigan position concerning the effectuation of
an adjudicated compromise affecting a testamentary trust will be adopted.
Summary. Presently, the Wisconsin courts can still recognize the
inherent, constitutional right to make a will and at the same time approve
compromise agreements which evade a valid testamentary disposition.
The rationale is that the property is considered as passing by the will
and any rights acquired by the compromise agreement are contractual
so that testamentary intent is effectuated. Nevertheless, the right to dis-
pose of property by will is limited if at the same time the will is admitted
to probate it is recognized that the estate is to be administered according
to the terms of the agreement. Earlier Wisconsin decisions had rejected
this rationale. Perhaps Wisconsin has recognized that under certain
circumstances, it is justifiable to impose through compromise agreements
a limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will. But why does
not Wisconsin, like New York, admit that the intentions of the testator
may be altered for real and substantial reasons, instead of insisting that
the wishes of the testator have been enforced?
Massachusetts
Common Law; Rationale. Compromise agreements concerning a
decedent's will were enforceable and supported by public policy in Massa-
chusetts prior to the enactment of the original compromise of wills
statute . 3 It was and still is recognized that persons who are sui juris
82. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 318-31(1) (1958).
83. Leach v. Forbes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 506 (1958). The compromise of wills
statute originally enacted in 1864 is now MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 §§ 15-18
(1955). Section 15 provides:
The supreme judicial court or the probate court may authorize the persons
named as executors in an instrument purporting to be the last will of a person
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have full power to enter into contracts respecting property to which
they are entitled under a will, provided no future contingent interests are
affected, without the aid of statutes.8 4 If a will contest is to be withdrawn
in return for the payment of a certain sum or for a specific share of the
estate, the agreement is enforceable at law for the recovery of the sum
or by an action for specific performance."5
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law. Since future contingent
interests are often involved in compromise agreements, one of the main
purposes of the statute is to provide a means by which in effectuating
these agreements the interests may be bound."8 The statute, applicable
to all controversies concerning a decedent's will and not just the con-
troversies where future contingent interests or persons not legally com-
petent to act are or might be affected, may also have eliminated any
uncertainty in carrying out an agreement consummated by persons legally
competent to contract, even when these specially protected interests were
not affected." The adjudicated compromise does provide certain ad-
vantages not available to an agreement enforceable only as a contract.
Once the award or compromise is approved by the court, it becomes a
matter of record in that the decree admitting the will to probate generally
contains a clause stating that the estate shall be administered according
to the terms of the agreement.88 This conclusively establishes the form
and validity of the agreement. Furthermore, the decree admitting the
will to probate stipulates that the agreement is to be carried out by the
persons administering the will and not by the parties themselves.8 9
Since, as will be discussed, the statute is interpreted using the con-
tract rationale, it naturally follows that the parties required to execute a
compromise agreement for which judicial approval is sought are not
essentially different from those who would be required parties to an
deceased, or the petitioners for administration with such will annexed, to adjust
by arbitration or compromise any controversy between the persons who claim
as devisees or legatees under such will and the persons entitled to the estate of
the deceased under the laws regulating the descent and distribution of intestate
estates. ...
84. E.g., Manganiello v. Caggiano, 338 Mass. 542, 156 N.E.2d 41 (1959); Copeland
v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918).
85. E.g., Mulligan v. McDonagh, 307 Mass. 464, 30 N.E.2d 385 (1940); Renwick
v. Macomber, 225 Mass. 380, 114 N.E. 720 (1917).
86. See Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918).
87. See Baxter v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854
(1911).
88. Mulligan v. McDonagh, 307 Mass. 464, 30 N.E.2d 385 (1940); Baxter v.
Treasurer and Receiver General, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911).
89. Ibid.
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agreement enforceable as a contract."0 However, the provisions for the
representation of minors and those under guardianship or conservator-
ship"' and those providing for the protection of future contingent inter-
ests 2 may have made possible compromise agreements not enforceable
prior to the enactment of the adjudicated compromise statute. Massa-
chusetts also requires that a compromise agreement be executed by an
executor or petitioner with the will annexed." Since the practice of the
court is to insert in the decree admitting the will to probate a clause pro-
viding that the estate is to be administered according to the terms of the
agreement, this requirement is one of convenience rather than a recogni-
tion that a compromise agreement may affect the right to dispose of
property by will.
It appears from the wording of the compromise of wills statute and
from the cases applying the statute that there is no obstacle to the judicial
approval of an agreement compromising a contest concerning the ad-
mission to probate of a will which provides for a testamentary trust."
Furthermore, if a controversy arises concerning a testamentary trust
after the will has been admitted to probate and the trust established,
90. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 15 (1955) specifies that "the persons named
as executors, or the petitioners for administration with the will annexed . . . those
claiming as devisees or legatees whose interests will in the opinion of the court be
affected by the proposed arbitration or compromise, and those claiming the estate as
intestate, shall be parties." See Manganiello v. Caggiano, 338 Mass. 542, 156 N.E.2d
41 (1959) ; Mulligan v. McDonagh, 307 Mass. 464, 30 N.E.2d 385 (1940) ; Sherman v.
Warren, 211 Mass. 288, 97 N.E. 892 (1912).
91. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 18 (1955) provides for representation by
the guardian of any person without legal capacity, or the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, if these interests are necessary parties as required by MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 204 § 15 and the guardian or guardian ad litem is authorized to "make and receive
all proper conveyances and payments necessary to carry into effect any award or
compromise sanctioned by the court."
92. MAss GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 204 § 16 (1955) provides that, "If the court finds
that any future contingent interests which would be affected by the arbitration or
compromise, it shall appoint some person to represent such interests in such con-
troversy. . . ." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 17 (1955) provides that if an award
or compromise is "found by the court to be just and reasonable in relation to the parties
in being and in its effect upon any future contingent interests that might arise under
such will . . ." it shall be "valid and binding upon such interests . . . as well as upon
the interests of all persons in being. . . ." These provisions have provided an adequate
defense to the argument that it is unconstitutional to deprive a person of his property
without his consent in Neafsey v. Chincholo, 225 Mass. 12, 113 N.E. 651 (1916). But see
Copeland v. Wheelright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918). A future contingent
interest may be entirely extinguished by agreement when the interest may be "so remote,
and its actual enjoyment so improbable that its retention would appear to be nothing
more substantial than a film of mist." Id. at 137, 119 N.E. at 669.
93. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 15 (1955).
94. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 15 (1955) which provides for the
adjustment by arbitaration or compromise of any controversy under a will; Copeland
v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918); Ellis v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39,
116 N.E. 956 (1917); Lincoln v. Wood, 128 Mass. 203 (1880).
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Massachusetts has another statute by which an agreement compromising
the controversy may receive judicial authorization.95
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law Rationale. Even though
the decree admitting the will to probate generally provides that the estate
is to be administered according to the terms of the agreement, the com-
promise of wills statute is not regarded as a limitation upon the right to
dispose of property by will." The enactment is construed as providing
a means by which real controversies between persons claiming the estate
as beneficiaries and those claiming as statutory distributees may be settled
by agreement, however complicated the controversy may be, subject to the
supervisory powers of the court to see that the agreement is just and rea-
sonable toward all interests whether in being or future and contingent."
The entire effect of the decree may be a modification of the will, but the
Massachusetts courts consider that any such effect results from the
concessions made by the legatees to the intestate successors or to them-
selves as to what disposition shall be made of interests granted to them
by the will and does not result from any change in the provisions of the
will. 8 The rights of the parties take effect by the agreement and the
decree confirming it and not by the will.9
The recognition by Massachusetts that an adjudicated compromise
is desirable even when testamentary trusts are established is not present
in Michigan and New York, despite the purposes for which these statutes
95. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 14 (1955) provides that:
The supreme judicial court or the probate court may authorize an executor,
administrator . . . or a trustee, to adjust by arbitration or compromise any
controversy or question as to the administration or distribution of the estate in
his possession . . . or as to any matter relating to said estate, or as to the
construction of a will or trust created by a written instrument . . . or as to
any controversy growing out of said will or instrument that may arise between
him and any other person . . . interested under said will or instrument or in
said estate, or between claimants to said estate. . . .
This statute could conceivably be applied to effectuate the compromise of a will contest
or controversy, but the presence of MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 15-18 (1955)
makes this unnecessary. For compromise agreements effectuated pursuant to MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 204 § 14 (1955) see, e.g., Willcutt v. Prescott, 340 Mass. 532,
165 N.E.2d 105 (1960) ; Clarke v. Cordis, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 466 (1862). This statute
also has provisions requiring the requisite parties to execute the agreement and insuring
the protection of minors, persons without legal capacity or under guardianship, or any
future contingent interests who may be affected, by the appointment of persons to repre-
sent such persons or interests.
96. See, e.g., Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918); Ellis
v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39, 116 N.E. 956 (1917).
97. Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N.E. 667 (1918); Ellis v. Hunt,
228 Mass. 39, 116 N.E. 956 (1917).
98. Ellis v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39, 116 N.E. 956 (1917) ; Baxter v. Treasurer and
Receiver General, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911).
99. E.g., Mulligan v. McDonagh, 307 Mass. 464, 30 N.E.2d 385 (1940); Neafsey
v. Chincholo, 225 Mass. 12, 113 N.E. 651 (1916); Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471,
90 N.E. 861 (1910).
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were enacted, apparently on the ground that to approve such an agreement
would be to defeat testamentary intent. It is not clear whether this
Massachusetts statute is regarded as imposing a limitation upon the right
to dispose of property by will. Since the statute providing for the ap-
proval of agreements affecting established testamentary trusts is sub-
stantially similar to the compromise of wills statute which has been in-
terpreted as not limiting the right to dispose of property by will, the
former statute may likewise be regarded as only facilitating contracts
between claimants to a decedent's estate and not affecting the right to
dispose of property by will.
Summary. Massachusetts, like most states providing for an adjudi-
cated compromise of will contests and controversies, adopted legislation
to facilitate compromise agreements between beneficiaries under a will
and the intestate successors, but especially so when future contingent
interests or persons without legal competence to act were or might be
affected. If these latter interests are not to be affected, a compromise
agreement may be effectuated and enforced without the aid of the
adjudicated compromise statute. Consequently, the contract analysis is
adhered to by the Massachusetts courts, so that with or without the aid
of statutes a compromise agreement is not considered a limitation upon
the right to dispose of property by will.
Pennsylvania
Common Law; Rationale. Prior to the enactment of the 1917
Fiduciaries Act10' providing for the compromise of controversies relating
to a decedent's estate, Pennsylvania recognized and enforced agreements
compromising will contests and controversies."~' The avoidance of litiga-
tion or the settlement of a family controversy were regarded as a suf-
ficient consideration to enable agreements consummated by persons sui
juris in the absence of fraud to be enforced as contracts.
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law. The 1917 statute pro-
vided that any question or dispute concerning the validity or construction
of any will or testament or the disposition of a decedent's estate could be
compromised or settled. The Fiduciaries Act of 1949 enacted substan-
tially the same provisionsP- but contained also a separate section by which
100. Pa. Pub. Law 1917 No. 193, § 40, at 508.
101. See, e.g., Bartholomew's Estate, 155 Pa. 283, 26 At. 214 (1893); Appeal of
Wilen 105 Pa. 121 (1884) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 8 Watts 195 (Pa. 1839).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.513 (1950).
Whenever it shall be proposed to compromise or settle any claim, whether in
suit or not, by or against the estate of a decedent, or to compromise or settle
any question or dispute concerning the validity or construction of any will, or
the distribution of all or any part of any decedent's estate, or any other contro-
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questions or disputes concerning trust estates could be compromised or
settled.'
The fact that the present adjudicated compromise statutes contain
no provisions specifying the parties required to execute a compromise
agreement,' coupled with the fact that compromise agreements are en-
forced or recognized without the aid of statutes,"0 5 supports the inference
that Pennsylvania enacted the common law position as to compromise
agreements. The courts probably consider, as was done in the absence
of statute, that the parties were contracting with their own property.
Notwithstanding the lack of specific provisions in the compromise of
controversies statutes providing for the representation of minors or
incompetents and for the protection of the unascertained or future con-
tingent interests, it appears that where these interests or persons are
or may be affected by a compromise agreement, their interests have
been represented or protected.0 6 Moreover, Pennsylvania has a court rule
by which a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent minors or
incompetents, or a trustee ad litem to represent an absentee, a presumed
decedent or unborn or unascertained person not already represented by a
fiduciary unless the court considers that these interests are adequately
represented.' 7 The rule thus insures that any judgment may be made
effective and conclusive upon all present and future contingent interests.
versy affecting any estate, the court, on petition by the personal representative
or by any party in interest setting forth all the facts and circumstances, and
after such notice as the court shall direct, aided if necessary by the report of a
master, may enter a decree authorizing the compromise or settlement to be made.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.945 (1950).
Whenever it shall be proposed to compromise or settle any claim, whether in
suit or not, by or against a trust, or to compromise or settle any question or
dispute concerning the validity or construction of any will or trust instrument,
or the distribution of all or any part of any trust, or any controversy affecting
any trust, the court on petition of the trustee or by any party in interest setting
forth all the facts and circumstances, and after such notice as the court shall
direct, aided if necessary by the report of a master, may enter a decree
authorizing the compromise or settlement to be made.
104. The 1917 enactment, Pa. Pub. Law 1917 No. 193, § 40, at 508 provided that
there should be due notice to all interested parties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 320.513,
320.945 specify "after such notice as the court shall direct."
105. See, e.g., Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109 A.2d 164 (1954) ; Fry v. Stetson, 370
Pa. 132, 87 A.2d 305 (1952) ; In the Matter of Estate of Kramer, 57 Daugh. 335 (Dauphin
County Pa. Ct. 1946); Wallace's Estate, 76 Pitts. Rep. 112 (Allegheny County Pa.
Ct. 1928).
106. See Stoffel's Estate, 295 Pa. 248, 145 AtI. 70 (1929) ; It re Small's Estate, 67
York 1 (York County Pa. Ct. 1953); Rainbow Estate, 93 Pitts. Rep. 461 (Allegheny
County Pa. Ct. 1945). But see Estate of Wanamaker, 54 Montg. 197 (Montgomery
County Pa. Ct. 1938) (it is not apparent if there was any representation for the
contingent interests interested in the estate, although the court did construe the trust as
not violating the rule against perpetuities).
107. PA. ORPHANS' CT. R. 4(a).
NOTES
The Pennsylvania position in regard to the compromise of con-
troversies concerning wills which provide for the establishment of trusts
is not apparent. The 1949 enactment applicable to trust estates is clearly
applicable to established testamentary trusts,"8 but it has not yet been
determined if it can be extended to trusts provided for by wills con-
cerning which a dispute has arisen as to their admission to probate. Cases
decided pursuant to the original compromise of wills statute, together
with cases decided without resort to any statutory provisions are not
helpful, since they present opposing points of view as to whether an agree-
ment compromising a contest concerning the admission to probate of a
will can be effectuated where there is a trust provided for by the terms
of the will."0 9
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law Rationale. It appears
from the few cases applying these statutes that Pennsylvania is in accord
with Michigan, Wisconsin and Massachusetts that a compromise agree-
ment does not limit the right to dispose of property by will. There is
little distinction between the cases applying the adjudicated compromise
statutes and the cases in which agreements are sought to be enforced or
recognized as contracts."' There is no reference to the effect of an
adjudicated compromise upon the right to dispose of property by will."'
Where a compromise agreement was enforced as a contract, even though
the adjudicated compromise statute was available to the parties, the court
did not regard the agreement as a limitation upon the right to dispose of
property by will."' It was held that the agreement did not affect the
validity of the will, for when the agreement was consummated the rights
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.945 (1950); Middleton Estate, 1 Pa. D.&C.2d
162 (Bucks County Ct. 1954); In re Smals Estate, 67 York 1 (York County Pa.
Ct. 1953).
109. Compare Stoffel's Estate, 295 Pa. 248, 145 Atl. 70 (1929) and Estate of
Wanamaker, 54 Montg. 197 (Montgomery County Pa. Ct. 1938) with Martin Estate,
349 Pa. 255, 36 A.2d 786 (1944) and Schwehm's Estate, 264 Pa. 355, 107 Atl. 699 (1919).
110. Compare Crawford's Estate, 320 Pa. 444, 182 Atl. 252 (1936); Stoffel's
Estate, 295 Pa. 248, 145 AtI. 70 (1929); Middleton Estate, 1 Pa. D.&C.2d 162 (Bucks
County Ct. 1954) ; Estate of Wanamaker, 54 Montg. 197 (Montgomery County Pa. Ct.
1938) with Bartholomew's Estate, 155 Pa. 283, 26 At. 214 (1893) ; Appeal of Wilen, 105
Pa. 121 (1884) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 8 Watts 195 (Pa. 1839).
111. But see In re Small's Estate, 67 York 1 (York County Pa. Ct. 1953) con-
struing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 320.945 (1950) which is based upon the compromise of
wills statute and its predecessor, the 1917 enactment. The court may have announced
a position similar to that of N.Y. in that it stressed the importance of testamentary
intent, but stated the statute "must be construed to mean it shall only apply when an
actual question, dispute or controversy concerning the validity of the construction of a
will or trust instrument is raised. This section of the statute was not intended as
authority for the rewriting of a testator's will." Id. at 7.
112. In the Matter of Estate of Kramer, 57 Dauph. 335 (Dauphin Pa. County
Ct. 1946).
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of the parties had become fixed so that they were contracting with regard
to their own property.
Summary. It appears that the adjudicated compromise statutes did
little more in Pennsylvania than enact the prevailing common law that
compromise agreements are enforceable as contracts. However, the com-
mon law may have been expanded as to the permissibility of compromise
agreements affecting testamentary trusts once established. This would be
similar to Massachusetts which also has a separate statute applicable to
trusts, but different from Michigan which has no such statute and from
New York which apparently has such a statute but does not apply it.
New Jersey
Common Law; Rationale. Agreements compromising will contests
and controversies were enforceable in New Jersey prior to the enactment
of the original compromise of claims statute, on the basis of contract
law." 3 The courts maintained that the avoidance of litigation or the
compromise of a doubtful question was a sufficient consideration to sup-
port the agreement.
Effect of the Statute Upon Common Law and Common Law
Rationale. New Jersey by statute permits a fiduciary to compromise
certain enumerated claims, or to submit the compromise to the court for
its approval." 4 These claims are substantially similar to those of the
Model Probate Code and the Michigan adjudicated compromise statute.115
The New Jersey statute, like that of Pennsylvania, has neither provisions
stipulating which persons are required to execute a compromise agree-
ment nor provisions for the representation of minors, incompetents, un-
ascertained or future contingent interests, except that a minor or mental
incompetent may make a claim through his guardian."' The absence of
any such provisions together with the fact that compromise agreements
113. E.g, Grandin v. Grandin, 49 N.J.L. 508, 9 Atl. 756 (1887) ; Bell v. White, 76
N.J. Eq. 49, 73 Ati. 861 (1909) ; Rue v. Meirs, 43 N.J. Eq. 377, 12 Atl. 369 (1887).
114. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3A:14-1 (1953).
115. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3A:14-2 (1953). These claims are:
a. The probate of any writing purporting to be the decedent's will.
b. The construction, validity or effect of any will of the decedent or any
such writing, or of any trust.
c. The rights or interests in the estate of the decedent of any person, whether
claiming under a will or as heir, next of kin or spouse,
d. The rights or interests of any cestui que trust or ward,
e. The administration of the estate of any decedent, any trust or guardianship,
f. Any demand owing to or by the estate, trust, guardianship or ward, or
g. Any other matter relative to the estate or trust or the death of a decedent,
or the guardianship or ward.
116. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3A:14-2 (1953).
NOTES
appear to be enforceable without the aid of any statutory provisions""7
indicates that New Jersey has enacted the common law position with
regard to compromise agreements. Consequently, this statute would not
be considered as a limitation upon the right to dispose of property by will,
but simply as providing statutory recognition of contracts by persons
who have acquired property by will.
Rhode Island
The Rhode Island adjudicated compromise statute enables the state
supreme court to authorize an executor or petitioner with the will annexed
to compromise all controversies that may arise or exist as to an instru-
ment purporting to be a decedent's last will before the instrument is ad-
mitted to probate.1 8 It does not appear that there was litigation con-
cerning compromise agreements before this statute. This statute, like
most adjudicated compromise statutes, specifies those parties required to
execute a compromise agreement,"' provides for the representation of
persons legally incompetent to act 2 . and insures the protection of future
contingent interests that will be affected by a compromise agreement.'
The Rhode Island adjudicated compromise statute and the cases ap-
plying it definitely establish that a compromise agreement does limit the
right to dispose of property by will. It is not contended that an estate is
distributed according to the provisions of the will with any ultimate
deviation from the testator's directions resulting from concessions made
by the legatees or devisees as to their own property. The statute spe-
cifically provides that when a compromise agreement is confirmed by the
court, "the estate is to be administered and disposed of according to the
provisions of the will as modified by the compromise." '122 This provision
has been interpreted as incorporating an award or compromise into the
will, so that any person receiving part of the estate by virtue of the
compromise takes as a legatee, just as if such provisions were originally
in the will.
Indiana
In 1953, Indiana enacted sections 93-95 of the Model Probate
117. See DeCaro v. DeCaro, 13 N.J. 36, 97 A.2d 658 (1953).
118. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-7-12 (1956).
119. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-7-13 (1956).
120. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-7-14 (1956).
121. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-7-15 (1956).
122. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-7-17 (1956).
123. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. 1926) ; Barber v. Westcott,
21 R.I. 355, 43 At. 844 (1899).
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Code." 4 There has been no litigation concerning this adjudicated compro-
mise statute, but it appears that compromise agreements were recognized
by the Indiana courts prior to the enactment. 5 One of the cases recogniz-
ing an agreement compromising a will contest held that the state inherit-
ance tax should be assessed by virtue of the transfer of the property by
will and not by the agreement.' The agreement was said not to affect
the validity of the will, as those persons who acquired property by virtue
of the agreement received this property not as legatees but as assignees
of those to whom the property was devised by will. It is possible that this
same interpretation will be given to a compromise agreement effectuated
pursuant to the adjudicated compromise statute. If so, Indiana would be
in accord with the majority of states having adjudicated compromise
statutes that an adjudicated compromise is enforced upon a contract
rationale and does not limit the right to dispose of property by will.
CONCLUSION
The states that have enacted adjudicated compromise statutes regard
the avoidance of litigation and the maintenance of family harmony as a
sufficient justification for the approval or authorization of an agreement
compromising a will contest or controversy. It is primarily for these
objectives that compromise agreements are enforceable as contracts in
the absence of statute. Consequently, as at common law, many adjudi-
cated compromises are not regarded as a limitation upon the right to
dispose of property by will.
124. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 to -304 (Bums 1953). Section 7-301 provides:
The compromise of any contest or controversy as to
(a) Admission to probate of any instrument offered at the last will of any
decedent,
(b) The construction, validity or effect of such instrument,(c) The rights or interests in the estate of the decedent of any person,
whether claiming under a will or as heir,(d) The rights or interests of any beneficiary of any testamentary trust, or
(e) The administration of the estate of any decedent or of any testamentary
trust, whether or not there is or may be any person interested who is a minor
or otherwise without legal capacity to act in person or whose present existence
or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, or whether or not there is any inalienable
estate or future contingent interest which may be affected by such comprise
[compromise], shall, if made in accordance with the provisions of this code,
be lawful and binding upon all the parties thereto, whether born or unborn,
ascertained or unascertained, including such as are represented by trustees,
guardians of estates and guardians ad litem; but no such compromise shall in
any way impair the right of creditors or of taxing authorities.
125. See, e.g, Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Kitchin, 119 Ind. App. 422, 86
N.E.2d 96 (1940); Becker v. Becker, 46 Ind. App. 93, 91 N.E. 966 (1910).
126. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Kitchin, 119 Ind. App. 422, 86 N.E.2d 96
(1949).
NOTES
In spite of what may be justifiable reasons for the recognition or
enforcement of compromise agreements on the basis of contract law or by
virtue of an adjudicated compromise statute, the courts are avoiding the
basic issues, at least in regard to will contests. When agreements com-
promising a will contest are sought to be enforced or approved by courts,
the courts do not ultimately determine the validity of the grounds for the
contest; rather, they consider whether the agreements were made in good
faith, whether there was a possibility that the issue could be decided
either way and whether there was fraud surrounding the consummation
of the agreement. In cases where the principal beneficiaries under the
will receive a larger portion of the estate after a compromise agreement
than if intestacy had resulted, they are benefited by the fact that the
testator may have lacked testamentary capacity or failed to adhere to the
requisite formalities. At times, the principal beneficiaries may have
actually exerted an undue influence over the testator, but because of the
fact that litigation on the subject could be decided either way, such persons
may be permitted to benefit by their own wrongdoing. Similarly, since
it is estimated that only 1%o of wills contested are set aside,"' is not the
avaricious contestant who presents an issue of fact as to the testamentary
capacity or the validity of the will and who receives a portion or larger
share of the estate by virtue of a compromise agreement receiving some-
thing he ordinarily would not receive some 99%o of the time?
There is more merit to the allowance of such agreements when
construction of the will is necessary. Perhaps the heirs are in much better
position to place a construction on the will that will achieve what the
testator desired. Yet here again, the courts do not attempt to ascertain
what the correct construction should be, but only consider whether a
compromise agreement was fairly entered into and settled a dispute
that could be decided either way by the courts. Furthermore, should the
parties interested in an estate be permitted to construe as valid certain
terms of a will which could be construed to violate a statutory prohibition?
Finally, why are not all of the adjudicated compromise statutes, as
well as compromise agreements generally, recognized as a limitation
upon the right to dispose of property by will? The reasons for authorizing
or approving these limitations appear justifiable and are supported by
public policy, as indicated by the favorability with which they are received
by most courts. The right to make a will is generally recognized as one
created by statute, subject to the control of the legislature, so that an
adjudicated compromise which limits the right to dispose of property
127. ATxINsoN, WILLS 518 (2nd ed. 1953).
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by will can be justified on this basis. In many instances the intentions of
a testator can be frustrated. For example, the wishes of a testator as
expressed by will are not followed when the rule against perpetuities is
violated, when the testator has imposed unreasonable restraints upon the
alienation of property, when a widow pursues her dower rights or
statutory forced share against the will, when beneficiaries completely re-
nounce their rights under a will and when a beneficiary receiving property
under a will immediately distributes it in a manner which he considers
more equitable than that stated in a will. Nevertheless, whether the rights
acquired by virtue of a compromise agreement are regarded as entitling
one to receive this property or interest as if one were a devisee or legatee,
or whether a compromise agreement is regarded as not altering the fact
that the property passes to the devisees and legatees at the moment of
the testator's death with any rights acquired by virtue of this agreement
as being contractual and not testamentary, the result is the same-the
limitation or destruction of the right to dispose of property by will.
VACATING PLAT DEDICATIONS IN INDIANA
The modern subdivision developer's practice of dedicating more
land to public uses to satisfy the new-home buyer's demand for particular
land use has created a peculiar titles problem in Indiana. Since Indiana
holds that a dedication of land to a particular public use creates only an
easement for the intended use in the public with the fee reserved in the
dedicator,' the title to dedicated land is not held by the governmental
authority charged with the responsibility of utilizing the land for the
particular purpose. Often, acquisition of the fee by the governmental
unit is, for practical purposes, a necessity to effectuate the intended use
of the land. For example, if land is dedicated for a purpose that requires
expensive improvements in order to comply with the dedication, e.g., a
school building on land dedicated for school purposes, it is impossible
to obtain sufficient funds to erect the building because the easement does
not provide sufficient security for the lender's money.2 The anomaly is
1. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21, 43 N.E. 942 (1896); Decker v.
Evansville Suburban & N. Ry., 133 Ind. 493, 33 N.E. 349 (1893) ; Brackney v. Boyd, 71
Ind. App. 592, 123 N.E. 695 (1919).
2. If the security for borrowed funds is only an easement for school purposes plus
the improvements thereon, the lender lacks a sufficient remedy against the borrower
on default. If he forecloses or reclaims the land and buildings, they will no longer be
used for school purposes since the school corporation is the only governmental unit
